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he euro area is facing a challenge with Greece 
in danger of falling into sovereign default and 
some of its other members, the so-called 
‘GIPSY’ nations,
1 finding themselves in serious 
financial distress. Creation of a European Monetary 
Fund
2 to deal more effectively with this type of 
situation is gaining support. This paper draws lessons 
from the Asian experience that might be applied to the 
current European development.  
The Asian Monetary Fund is on its way. It started with 
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which was the only 
initiative that became a reality at the East Asian level 
following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 
The CMI was a series of bilateral currency swap 
arrangements among the ASEAN +3 countries, the 
three being China, Japan and Korea. With the aim of 
providing short-term liquidity to a partner country in 
serious financial distress,
3 the volume of the bilateral 
contracts signed has increased, but they have never 
been used, even during the peak of the last financial 
crisis.
4 This was in part due to the fact that the area has 
a high savings rate and the amount of money on which 
a country can freely draw
5 is not sufficiently large. 
                                                      
1 Daniel Gros, Adjustment Difficulties in the GIPSY Club, CEPS 
Working Document No. 326, March 2010, CEPS.  
2 Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer, How to deal with sovereign 
default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 202, February 2010, CEPS. 
3 This initiative was agreed at the ASEAN +3 finance ministers’ 
meeting held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in May 2001. As of April 
2009, the total contracts with the CMI amounted to $93 billion, 
according to the author’s own calculations. 
4 For example, Korea made a bilateral currency swap arrangement 
with the US in late 2008, which helped to ease the anxiety of 
Korea’s exchange market. 
5 An IMF conditionality applies to the CMI, which enables 20% of 
the swap arrangements to be drawn without the IMF’s consent. 
Limitations like these, combined with efforts to 
provide a better safety net and more efficient financial 
resource allocation for the region, have resulted in a 
new initiative called the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM).   
CMIM as precursor to the Asian Monetary 
Fund 
The CMIM was agreed in the ASEAN +3 finance 
ministers’ meeting held in Bali, Indonesia, on 3 May 
2009. With a total contribution of $120 billion (about 
€82 billion at an average 2008 annual euro/dollar rate), 
the CMIM is an establishment of a fund from which a 
member nation can swap its national currency for US 
dollars within a pre-determined maximum. The 
following table shows the contribution of the fund and 
the maximum amount that each country can withdraw. 
Note that the withdrawal rates ensure that smaller 
contributors are given full credit for their 
contributions. The IMF conditionality holds the same 
under the CMIM as in the CMI. A purchasing multiple 
of 5 entitles the country to have full access to its 
contribution. It should also be noted that there was 
some competition among the countries to have more 
shares. China and Japan were tied at 32%, which is 
smaller than their GDP shares. Both Korea and the 
ASEAN countries have more shares than their GDP 
shares, with Korea at 16%, and the ASEAN members 
at 20%. The major reason behind the competition is the 
belief that the allocation will have a lasting impact on 
the voting power of the member countries in building 
future regional institutions. East Asia is in the early 
stages of regional economic integration and the CMIM 
is a virtually unique achievement in the process.  
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Table 1. Contribution and withdrawal rights under CMIM 
Country 
Contribution 
($ billion) 
Share of total 
contributions (%) 
Withdrawal rate 
(purchasing multiple) 
Share of GDP 
 (% of total) 
Brunei 0.03  0.03  5  0.12 
Cambodia 0.12  0.10  5  0.09 
China ex.HK  34.2  28.50  0.5  36.41 
HK 4.2  3.50  2.5  1.81 
Indonesia 4.77  3.98  2.5  4.31 
Japan 38.4  32.00  0.5  41.32 
South Korea  19.2  16.00  1  7.82 
Laos 0.03  0.03  5  0.05 
Malaysia 4.77  3.98  2.5  1.86 
Myanmar 0.06  0.05  5 0.22 
Philippines 3.68  3.07  2.5 1.40 
Singapore 4.77  3.98  2.5  1.53 
Thailand 4.77  3.98  2.5  2.30 
Vietnam 1  0.83  5  0.76 
        
+3 (China, Japan and Korea)    80.00    87.36 
Note: Each CMIM participant is entitled to swap its local currency with the US dollars for an amount up to its contribution multiplied by its 
purchasing multiplier. The last column indicates the proportion of the GDP (in US dollars, 2008) of the nation in the total GDP of the 
CMIM nations. 
The CMIM is a commitment with no actual 
submission of money, and therefore not a physical 
establishment like an ordinary fund. However the legal 
documents of agreement and a regulatory framework 
have been circulated and signed. The entity came into 
effect on the 24
th of March 2010. It is expected that a 
surveillance body of the CMIM will soon be set up in 
one of the ASEAN cities. When the CMIM has such 
an institutional structure in place, it will effectively 
become an Asian Monetary Fund.  
Table 2. A comparison between the EMF and AMF 
  European Monetary Fund  Asian Monetary Fund 
Function  •  Sovereign fund to bail out countries in 
crisis 
•  Expected to act as a regional monetary 
stabiliser. There is no regional currency 
and thus exchange risks are present all the 
time. A high level of foreign reserves in 
the region, however,  makes the role of 
this fund somewhat limited. 
Establishment/enforcement  •  Countries with a higher likelihood of a 
crisis will have to contribute more. 
Little competition toward larger 
contribution shares. 
•  No IMF conditionality, but possibly 
conditionality at the EU level 
•  Competition towards a higher 
contribution, as the allocations within the 
AMF will be likely to impact the politics 
of future Asian regional institutions. 
•  IMF conditionality 
Link with regional 
economic integration 
•  A step forward although 
complementary to other initiatives in 
European monetary integration. The 
eurozone has the euro as a single 
currency, the ECB, and other 
institutions, e.g.  the European 
Commission and the European 
Parliament. 
•  Offers a significant symbolic 
representation of progress in East Asian 
financial integration. 
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A significant step forward for Asia 
Formation of the Asian Monetary Fund is a significant 
step towards improving Asia’s financial stability.
6 East 
Asia is an area where real economic activities are 
strongly linked. As the following figures show, the 
share of trade in goods and services between East 
Asian countries is high, while transactions in financial 
assets are not as high. This implies that East Asia is 
well integrated in real economic activities, but less so 
in financial activities. 
Figure 1. Strong linkage in real activities of Asia: 
Regional trade share, 2007 (percent) 
 
Source: Baek and Oh, “Global Crisis and Currency 
Competition in the Asia-Pacific Region”, in Y. Oh (ed.), The 
World Economy with the G-20, CEPR-KIEP, 2009, based on 
data from the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, April 2009.  
 
Figure 2. Regional share of total portfolio investment, 
year-end 2007 (percent) 
 
Source:  Baek and Oh, “Global Crisis and Currency 
Competition in the Asia-Pacific Region”, in Y. Oh (ed.), The 
World Economy with the G-20, CEPR-KIEP, 2009, based on 
data from the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, April 2009. 
                                                      
6 See also Henning, The Future of the Chiang Mai Initiative: An 
Asian Monetary Fund?,  Policy Brief 09-5 (2009), Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
These countries do not have a currency of their own in 
settling trade. Trade contracts are settled mainly in US 
dollars. Gains from real economic integration – low 
production costs, higher production levels, competitive 
advantages for consumers, etc. – can easily be lost by 
losses in currency values vis-à-vis the US dollar. This 
sort of situation happened during 2008-09 as in 1997-
98. Some call this a currency crisis in contrast to the 
financial crisis. The relatively limited exposure to 
developed markets by most of the Asian financial 
firms has helped Asian countries. But foreign 
exchange markets have been hit badly, partly because 
foreign investors withdrew their portfolio investments 
out of Asian markets. The Asian Monetary Fund to be 
developed from the CMIM will primarily target the 
stabilisation of foreign exchange markets in the region. 
Another important feature of the CMIM is that it 
collects savings created within East Asia and uses 
them only for the contributing nations. It effectively 
circulates Asian savings within the region. Its creation 
is a more significant step than the old CMI scheme, 
because not only the size of the pool available to 
member countries is larger, but its extension into an 
Asian Monetary Fund will send a strong message in 
support of the development of regional financial 
markets.  
There are remaining tasks. The independent 
surveillance mechanism is expected to be working 
within the next two to three years at best. Support from 
the +3 countries, in particular China, is ambiguous. 
Equally important, East Asia will have to make the 
fund a useful and perhaps popular resort of financing. 
It will compete against high savings and reserves of 
the region, as well as the IMF. 
So, is the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund an 
excessive choice? The answer would be no. 
Maintaining large foreign reserves is a costly business. 
China for example has the largest amount of foreign 
reserves in the world. If the US dollar falls in value, 
not only does the value of the US dollar-denominated 
assets held by China fall, but the renminbi will face 
strong revaluation pressures. If the US recession 
continues, this will reduce demand for Chinese 
exports, exacerbating the economy’s woes. Smaller 
economies like Korea face a similar set of challenges. 
How effective the IMF lending facilities will become 
following the G-20 reform process remains 
questionable. Therefore, there are sound arguments in 
favour of developing an Asian Monetary Fund.  About CEPS
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